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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Politics' and 'Causal Powers'

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219 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Free and great-souled men do not keep asking "what is the use of it?" [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life [Harré/Madden]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews [Harré/Madden]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Our method of inquiry is to examine the smallest parts that make up the whole [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations [Harré/Madden]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences [Harré/Madden]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reasoning distinguishes what is beneficial, and hence what is right [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Intelligence which looks ahead is a natural master, while bodily strength is a natural slave [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates [Harré/Madden]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
Men are natural leaders (apart from the unnatural ones) [Aristotle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
'If each is small, so too are all' is in one way false, for the whole composed of all is not small [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous' [Harré/Madden]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut [Harré/Madden]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / e. Psychologism
There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / a. Fundamental reality
Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball [Harré/Madden]
Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released [Harré/Madden]
Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity) [Harré/Madden]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden]
We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden]
Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
The whole is prior to its parts, because parts are defined by their role [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden]
Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden]
A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river' [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise [Harré/Madden]
A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual [Harré/Madden]
Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation [Harré/Madden]
People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent [Harré/Madden]
Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature [Harré/Madden]
There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden]
Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden]
There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is the aim of our nature [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience [Harré/Madden]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden]
Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden]
The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden]
Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden]
Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden]
The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden]
The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Only changes require explanation [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
To grasp something, trace it back to its natural origins [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden]
Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
The nature of each thing is its mature state [Aristotle]
Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers [Harré/Madden]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised [Harré/Madden]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
The Electra: she knows this man, but not that he is her brother [Eucleides, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric now enables good speakers to become popular leaders [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it [Harré/Madden]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
A community can lack self-control [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Nothing contrary to nature is beautiful [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
The collective judgement of many people on art is better than that of an individual [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Music can mould the character to be virtuous (just as gymnastics trains the body) [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Some say slavery is unnatural and created by convention, and is therefore forced, and unjust [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Spirit [thumos] is the capacity by which we love [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Selfishness is wrong not because it is self-love, but because it is excessive [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The chief good is unity, sometimes seen as prudence, or God, or intellect [Eucleides]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
The function of good men is to confer benefits [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtuous people are like the citizens of the best city [Aristotle]
People become good because of nature, habit and reason [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The law is the mean [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
Virtue is concerned with correct feelings [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice is a virtue of communities [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
The rich are seen as noble, because they don't need to commit crimes [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Master and slave can have friendship through common interests [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is by nature a political animal [Aristotle]
People want to live together, even when they don't want mutual help [Aristotle]
Only humans have reason [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The community (of villages) becomes a city when it is totally self-sufficient [Aristotle]
A community must share a common view of good and justice [Aristotle]
People who are anti-social or wholly self-sufficient are no part of a city [Aristotle]
Friendship is the best good for cities, because it reduces factions [Aristotle]
A community should all share to some extent in something like land or food [Aristotle]
A city can't become entirely one, because its very nature is to be a multitude [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
The size of a city is decided by the maximum self-sufficient community that can be surveyed [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
What is the best life for everyone, and is that a communal or an individual problem? [Aristotle]
The happiest city is the one that acts most nobly [Aristotle]
The same four cardinal virtues which apply to individuals also apply to a city [Aristotle]
Every state is an association formed for some good purpose [Aristotle]
A city aims at living well [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The best constitution enables everyone to live the best life [Aristotle]
A city is a community of free people, and the constitution should aim at the common advantage [Aristotle]
The six constitutions are monarchy/tyranny, aristocracy/oligarchy, and polity/democracy [Aristotle]
Constitutions specify distribution of offices, the authorities, and the community's aim [Aristotle]
The greed of the rich is more destructive than the greed of the people [Aristotle]
Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two [Aristotle]
We must decide the most desirable human life before designing a constitution [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
A citizen is someone who is allowed to hold official posts in a city [Aristotle]
The virtues of a good citizen are relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle]
A person can be an excellent citizen without being an excellent man [Aristotle]
The middle classes are neither ambitious nor anarchic, which is good [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Kings should be selected according to character [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
The guardians should not be harsh to strangers, as no one should behave like that [Aristotle]
The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom [Aristotle]
The rich can claim to rule, because of land ownership, and being more trustworthy [Aristotle]
People who buy public office will probably expect to profit from it [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / c. Executive
Officers should like the constitution, be capable, and have appropriate virtues and justice [Aristotle]
In large communities it is better if more people participate in the offices [Aristotle]
Election of officials by the elected is dangerous, because factions can control it [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Like water, large numbers of people are harder to corrupt than a few [Aristotle]
The many may add up to something good, even if they are inferior as individuals [Aristotle]
Democracy arises when people who are given equal freedom assume unconditional equality [Aristotle]
Popular leaders only arise in democracies that are not in accord with the law [Aristotle]
Choosing officials by lot is democratic [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
No office is permanent in a democracy [Aristotle]
If the people are equal in nature, then they should all share in ruling [Aristotle]
It is wrong that a worthy officer of state should seek the office [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
In many cases, the claim that the majority is superior would apply equally to wild beasts [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Ultimate democracy is tyranny [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
We aim to understand the best possible community for free people [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Citizens do not just own themselves, but are also parts of the city [Aristotle]
Look at all of the citizens before judging a city to be happy [Aristotle]
Community is based on friends, who are equal and similar, and share things [Aristotle]
The best communities rely on a large and strong middle class [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
People care less about what is communal, and more about what is their own [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Owning and sharing property communally increases disagreements [Aristotle]
There could be private land and public crops, or public land and private crops, or both public [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Both women and children should be educated, as this contributes to a city's excellence [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Natural slaves are those naturally belonging to another, or who can manage no more than labouring [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
One principle of liberty is to take turns ruling and being ruled [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Equality is obviously there to help people who do not get priority in the constitution [Aristotle]
It is always the weak who want justice and equality, not the strong [Aristotle]
We can claim an equal right to aristocratic virtue, as well as to wealth or freedom [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
The Heraeans replaced election with lot, to thwart campaigning [Aristotle]
It is dreadful to neither give a share nor receive a share [Aristotle]
Faction is for inferiors to be equal, and equals to become superior [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Phaleas proposed equality of property, provided there is equality of education [Aristotle]
Wealth could be quickly leveled by only the rich giving marriage dowries [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Law is intelligence without appetite [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Property should be owned privately, but used communally [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
The good is obviously justice, which benefits the whole community, and involves equality in some sense [Aristotle]
Justice is the order in a political community [Aristotle]
Justice is equality for equals, and inequality for unequals [Aristotle]
The virtue of justice may be relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
Laws that match people's habits are more effective than mere written rules [Aristotle]
Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice [Aristotle]
If it is easy to change the laws, that makes them weaker [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
Correct law should be in control, with rulers only deciding uncertain issues [Aristotle]
It is said that we should not stick strictly to written law, as it is too vague [Aristotle]
It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
The whole state should pay for the worship of the gods [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
A state is plural, and needs education to make it a community [Aristotle]
A city has a single end, so education must focus on that, and be communal, not private [Aristotle]
The aim of serious childhood play is the amusement of the complete adult [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Men learn partly by habit, and partly by listening [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Abortions should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
If nature makes everything for a purpose, then plants and animals must have been made for man [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
The best instruments have one purpose, not many [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden]
Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions [Harré/Madden]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped [Harré/Madden]
'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions [Harré/Madden]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places [Harré/Madden]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2 [Harré/Madden]
Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum [Harré/Madden]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is not blessed and happy because of external goods, but because of his own nature [Aristotle]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
Men imagine gods to be of human shape, with a human lifestyle [Aristotle]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results [Harré/Madden]